The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has published safety recommendations to the managers and parent company of the cargo ship BBC Rhonetal, following an investigation into a fire in the hold of the vessel at Port Hedland, Western Australia in March 2021.
1 Origin of the fire
Shortly before smoke was observed rising from the lower hold, the bosun had been cutting fastenings with a plasma torch in an area on the tween deck which was located above a vibrating screen assembly stowed in the lower hold. The screen was later identified by firefighters from the Western Australia Department of Fire and Emergency Services as the origin of the fire.
The fire started when sparks and globules of molten metal generated by the plasma cutting fell through gaps in the tween deck and down onto the screen below. The hot material swiftly melted through the protective plastic covering on the screen and then onto its combustible internal components, which ignited shortly afterwards.
2 Fire watch
The shipboard safety management system (SMS) provided guidance for performing hot work safely. It required fire watches to be in place at all times during the work, including in adjacent compartments where appropriate, and fire rounds to be made for at least 2 hours following the conclusion of hot work.
However, the recall and reassignment of the ordinary seaman (OS) on fire watch to other duties meant that there was no fire watch in the lower hold while the bosun continued hot work activity above. At the time the OS was recalled, there was no sign of fire or smoke in the lower hold. This indicates that the fire almost certainly developed after the OS was recalled and left his post.
Had a continuous fire watch been maintained, it is likely that the sparks and molten metal falling from above would have been immediately identified and smothered by the OS before they ignited the combustible cargo. In the unlikely event that they did catch fire, the OS would have been stationed to promptly raise the alarm and attempt extinguishing the fire with the firefighting equipment at hand.
3 Fire risk assessment
Hot work practices on board indicated some general awareness of the fire risk associated with removing sea fastenings. This was evidenced by the completion of a hot work permit, availability and deployment of firefighting and fire prevention equipment and assigning a fire watch.
However, no efforts were made to assess or address specific fire risks associated with the flammability of vibrating screens in the lower hold. As a result, the cargo was not protected with specific, effective measures such as fire-retardant coverings and a continuous fire watch.
4 Safety management system implementation
The evidence shows that this fire resulted because the SMS procedure and guidance were not properly followed. A proper inspection for fire risks at the work site and surrounding areas was not undertaken. The risk assessment procedure was not followed to ensure specific risks associated with the task were identified, documented and mitigated and a continuous fire watch was not maintained for the duration of the hot work. While a safety meeting was held for the planned hot work, it was not effectively executed so as to prepare the crew for carrying out the task safely.
Non-adherence to basic safety precautions and hot work procedures have been a common factor in fires on board Briese ships. The number and frequency of these incidents in recent years, together with the circumstances of this fire, shows that the company had not effectively implemented its SMS procedures across its fleet.
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the fire within cargo hold number two on board BBC Rhonetal, Port Hedland, Western Australia.
1 Contributing factors
Sparks and molten metal generated from the removal of sea fastenings from the tween deck using a plasma cutting torch fell through gaps in the deck and ignited combustible cargo stowed in the cargo hold below.
Hot work continued on the tween deck after the fire watch had been asked to leave the lower hold to perform other duties. As a result, no one was in a position to immediately identify and respond to the fire that developed in the lower hold.
2 Other factors that increased risk
Items of cargo stowed in the lower hold below the work site were not adequately assessed as a fire risk and protected before starting the hot work.
BBC Rhonetal’s managers had not effectively implemented the shipboard safety management system procedures in place to prevent the fire. This was the tenth such fire on a company ship in the past 14 years, and the fourth investigated by the ATSB, identifying similar contributing factors
Recommendations
Taking into considering the factors that caused the fire, ATSB issued safety recommendations to the managers and parent company of the cargo ship BBC Rhonetal. More specifically, ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell, said that, “The ATSB is recommending the ship’s managers, Briese Heavylift, and its parent company Briese Schiffahrts, take safety action to ensure safety management system procedures are effectively implemented on BBC Rhonetal and all other relevant ships across their fleets.”
Download the full report: ATSB-Fire-onboard-BBC-Rhonetal-2022_09
